

# Contents

|   |      |
|---|------|
| <i>Series Preface</i>   | vii  |
| <i>Preface</i>  | ix   |
| <i>Glossary</i>   | xiii |
| 1. Modernity and Political Islam: Contestants or Companions?            | 1    |
| 2. The Saga of Muslim Spain: Pluralism to Elimination                   | 18   |
| 3. Muslims in Spain: Beginning of an End                                | 38   |
| 4. Islam and Britain: Old Cultures, Odd Encounters                      | 64   |
| 5. Muslims in Britain: Multiculturalism and the Emerging Discourse      | 93   |
| 6. Muslims in France, Germany and the European Union: Aliens or Allies? | 120  |
| 7. Ireland and Islam: Green Twins or Worlds Apart?                      | 137  |
| 8. Islam and the United States: New Friends or Old Enemies?             | 156  |
| Epilogue: Andalusia or Renaissance?                                     | 181  |
| Notes and References  | 185  |
| Bibliography  | 229  |
| Index   | 234  |

# 1 Modernity and Political Islam: Contestants or Companions?

There is a raging battle for the soul of religion between those who seek an accommodation with modernity and those who wish to stick strictly with the dogmatic certainties of the past ... This battle is not confined to Islam but rages in Catholicism and Judaism ... The hub of this battle is played out in the powerful sophisticated cities of the Western World, Paris, Rome, New York, London and indeed Dublin ... The struggle of Muslims for and against an accommodation with modernity is taking place, not just in Cairo, Tehran and Islamabad, but also among Muslims living in the West. The events of 11th September have brought the intensity of this struggle into sharp relief. (<[www.Irishcatholic.ie/030321-mthtm](http://www.Irishcatholic.ie/030321-mthtm)>)

Within the triangular relationship between Western societies, the Muslim diaspora and the Muslim world, there is a rather complex though not always conflictive interface in which each influences the other. Major events since the end of the Cold War in 1989–90 have signalled some of the most significant developments in this respect with crucial ramifications for all three. Events have also intensified the quest for identity among Muslims with reference to tradition and modernity. This relationship is neither totally tension-free nor is it characterised by continual strife. While, historically speaking, modernity has generated a broad range of liberationist ideas and empowering institutions, it has also advanced some of the most violent practices including the slave trade, racism and ethnic cleansing – at least in their modern dimensions. Muslims have usually accepted modernity, though not always willingly, and, in several cases, the haphazard nature of modernising efforts has increased anxieties and tensions, generating violent and fundamentalist reaction. In some cases, modernising yet non-representative regimes have themselves coopted and promoted fundamentalist groups. So, while an unquestioned celebration of modernity may not be totally appropriate, the uncritical conformity with tradition shorn of human rights and reinterpretation is equally dangerous. The violent and fundamentalist reaction to the abrasive forces of

modernity and globalisation is not confined to the world of Islam: in North America and across Europe, in Russia, India, Australasia and France, ultra-right forces are in the ascendant. In several Muslim countries, fundamentalists have been trying to assume centre stage by taking power, but it would be unfair to posit that the entire Islamic tradition is intolerant per se. However, judicious policies, universal political empowerment, economic stability, distributive justice, eradication of internal or regional conflicts and non-interference from outside are the prerequisites for effectively marginalising elements intent upon reducing a civilisational heritage such as Islam to a mere repressive dogma. The Westernised Muslim elite – the harbingers of modernity to the Islamic world – as well as their supporters elsewhere must urgently address the existing massive politico-economic alienation by offering accountable and transparent policies, otherwise violence and conflict will stay unabated.

However, it is important briefly to summarise some recent crucial developments and their imprints on Muslims before situating Islam – especially in the West – within the context of modernity.

The last few years have been a traumatic experience for Muslims across the world. Firstly, Salman Rushdie's publication of *The Satanic Verses* (1988) was met with anger and protests by many Muslims, who felt deeply hurt by his irreverence towards the Prophet, a consensus role model, or *insan-i-kamil* to them. Rushdie's satirical and arrogant attitude, combined with his own *Muslim* background, and with the continued marginalisation of the Muslim diaspora, especially in Britain, fuelled these protests. Many of the demonstrators, especially the younger generation, were, in fact, using the occasion to voice their own resentment against marginalisation in Western societies. Concurrently, certain exclusionary and alarmist sections used the anti-Rushdie demonstrations to reiterate their 'I-told-you-so' views on Islam. Liberals and other elements combined to portray Islam as an inherently anti-modern, anti-intellectual and anti-feminist ideology, which had refused to modernise itself. They were reluctant to look at a wider malaise within the context of a growing socioeconomic discontent spawning such protests.<sup>1</sup> The protesters torching the book in Bradford rekindled the stereotypes of Muslims *à la* Khomeini. Imam Khomeini's own fatwa against the British author in 1989 further aggravated the anger towards Islamic groups, which to many, had existed all along, below the surface, thanks to the legacy of the Crusades, colonialism, Orientalism and the continuing dominance of the West in international relations.

Secondly, Saddam Hussein's uncalled-for invasion of Kuwait further polarised the Muslim world as the Muslim nations and their umbrella organisation, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), like the UN, proved unable to prevent another war in the region, coming so soon after the Iraq–Iran War. Muslim debilitation as a result of the region's politics became more apparent when the United States and its global alliance undertook to liberate an oil-rich Kuwait, and in the process ordinary Iraqis lost their lives in droves thanks to 'turkey shoots'. Amidst the agonising Middle Eastern imbroglio, Yugoslavia fell apart, leaving its Muslim communities vulnerable to the xenophobic forces of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia. The painful Bosnian crisis, accompanied by widespread ethnic cleansing, gang rapes of thousands of Muslim women, the incarceration of countless Muslim men in concentration camps, and the sheer elimination of thousands in safe havens such as Srebrenica, once again exposed the peripheralisation of the Muslim factor in politics. Feelings of sheer helplessness and hurt pride reverberated all the more across the Muslim world as Russian nationalists mounted an annihilatory campaign in a defiant Chechnya. Muslims, to their discomfort, came to confront the painful vulnerability of small, disparate communities of co-religionists in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Palestine and Kashmir not long after the end of the Cold War. The Afghans, who earlier had been caught in the polarised world politics that occurred during the Cold War, put up a heroic fight against the Soviet invasion but now were divided into ethno-tribal configurations and, egged on by neighbours, engaged in killing sprees. As the world celebrated the fifth centenary of the Columbian expedition of 1492 and a burgeoning globalisation, Muslim communities bled profusely. For instance, Muslims accounted for three-quarters of the world's refugees.<sup>2</sup> The profusion of wars – mostly ethnic and rooted in politico-economic factors – was quickly interpreted by former Cold War protagonists as a 'clash of civilisations' in which Western civilisation was seen to be under a severe threat, mainly from Muslims. By the late twentieth century, Islam was the new bogeyman, Islamophobia was on the rise and Muslims were becoming the 'new Jews of the world'.<sup>3</sup>

Thirdly, in the new millennium, Muslim marginalisation within global politics became more apparent following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. The Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden and his Taleban hosts in Afghanistan dangerously reinforced pervasive negative images of Muslims. Not

only did a poor country like Afghanistan become the focus of a sustained and devastating bombing campaign causing death and destruction on an enormous scale, but Muslim communities in other disputed regions and in the diaspora also came under a hostile spotlight. Profiling of Muslim individuals, desecration of mosques and Muslim-owned properties, and harassment and imprisonment of Muslims happened amidst a growing tide of Islamophobia. Official restrictive policies and societal strictures against 'newer' communities reached their nadir as civil liberties were rolled back in a context of hyped-up patriotism and exclusionary nationalism. The US mass bombing campaign served only to encourage Russia, Israel and India to mount matching campaigns against their restive Muslim communities. The Muslim nations, by contrast, once again stood aloof as four million more Afghans were turned into refugees.<sup>4</sup> The United States had reacted too soon and too vengefully. Yet ironically even after such massive destruction of human communities and natural resources, the US could not even apprehend the two most wanted fugitives: Osama bin Laden and the Taleban's Mullah Muhammad Omar.<sup>5</sup> The year 2002 dawned as 'daisy cutters' and 'cave busters' rained down on Afghanistan, Chechens bled in the ruins of Grozny, Palestinians sought to escape Sharon's mortar and tank attacks, and India and Pakistan stepped nearer the brink of a nuclear war over the disputed territory of Kashmir; whereas partitioned Bosnia remained out on a limb. Preparations were already under way for extending the campaign to Iraq, Somalia, Indonesia, Yemen, the Sudan and possibly even Pakistan. The common opinion of Islam was immensely negative or even hostile. At the year's start, the entire Muslim world looked like a war zone, with Western troops patrolling the deserts and plains from Egypt to Kosovo and from Afghanistan to the southern Philippines,<sup>6</sup> while issues of political marginalisation, economic adversity and warfare in nearly all the Muslim regions continued to be ignored. The Muslim ruling elite – monarchs, dictators and pseudo-democrats – sat aloof, biding their time, while the fundamentalists offered a reductionist palliative to mundane hardships. While pseudo-reformists and fundamentalists in the Muslim world pursued power politics through naked violence, Muslims in the diaspora vacillated between the extreme positions of self-denial and increased religious assertion. In general, a large majority of Muslims, confronted by the severe backlash and disillusioned by pervasive helplessness, has become gravely introvert. Dismay with the contemporary political and religious leadership has

become quite apparent, and there is no alternative on the horizon. Consequently, the quest for identity has become more acute, and being a *Muslim* equally problematic.<sup>7</sup>

The tragic and ambiguous nature of the issues confronted by Muslim communities – not always of their own making – stipulates imperatives on a human and global scale. These serious political and economic issues have over the years been exacerbated by external interference. For instance, Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Somalia and Chechnya are volatile and in turmoil because of foreign invasions, not due to some indigenous Muslim penchant for violence. Focusing solely or primarily on Taleban stragglers, Northern Alliance foot soldiers, Hizbollah fighters, Hamas suicide bombers, Kashmiri insurgents or Chechen guerrillas may lead one to assume that the 1.5 billion-strong Muslim world – despite its inherent diversities – is simply a monolith of bloodthirsty terrorists, as typified by Osama or Omar. Thus, while there is a need to reconstruct Islamic discourse in its civilisational and human context, it is all the more urgent to understand the Muslim predicament and prospects through a more rigorous reflection.<sup>8</sup> For example, on the one hand, political Islam may stipulate resistance to Western hegemony; but at the same time many of its own current forms are equally totalitarian.<sup>9</sup> However, the very term *political Islam* or *Islamism* – as merely a theocracy to be imposed through brutal force – is a misnomer. In this volatile and depressing situation, a number of Muslims, especially in the diaspora, have been struggling to come to grips with these problems. Before one may venture to locate these responses one needs to conceptualise modernity and tradition within their global and specifically their *Muslim* context.

#### JUXTAPOSING MODERNITY

There is a danger that the current Muslim dilemma may quickly be attributed to some simplistic but dangerous theoretical paradigms, though more clear-sighted scholars have been indicating a more complex relationship.<sup>10</sup> Already, there are three main positions in vogue amongst such intellectuals; firstly, that Islam is totally incompatible with modernity and thus against integration, pluralism, democracy and human rights. According to this view, Muslims will not acquire peace and stability unless they develop a secular position, totally divorced from their Islamic heritage. It is further premised that Islam has not yet encountered modernity in the form of

'upheavals' like the Renaissance and the Reformation, and thus remains locked in a time-warp. This is a Eurocentric opinion which totally ignores the socioeconomic realities on the ground and fails to explain similar challenges confronting other non-Muslim regions in the developing world. The second view – an extreme one like the first – posits that reverting to a pristine Islam is the only way out. This emphasis on back-to-Islam or the reconversion of Muslims through a narrow and literally defined Islamicisation lacks systemic strategies and pathways. In most cases, it is an emotional, introvert and intolerant outburst and is reactive and repressive, as well as hastening fragmentation of the societal clusters. The third position, unlike the other two, is more rational and sustained. It looks at the multiplicity of problems confronted by Muslims and seeks a synthesised strategy for a holistic overhaul. Such a view seeks to incorporate Islamic as well as other human traditions to offer a dynamic solution in the form of universal empowerment, Muslim feminism, Muslim democracy and even Muslim secularism. This kind of wider empowerment, based on innovation – as permitted through *ijtihad* in classical Islam – and benefiting from the positive attributes of Western/Eastern modernity, is still an evolving intellectual paradigm confined to a few individuals or groups; but it holds the promise of a better future.

Obviously, the current ideological debate is not confined to non-Muslim groups; rather it is slowly becoming an intra-Muslim discourse. Muslims in the West are well placed to be the vanguard of this overdue intellectual effort, and despite the various challenges they need to be proactive. By linking Islamic civilisational traditions with the humane values of Western modernity, diasporic Muslim intellectuals and activists can offer linkages between the world of Islam and the West. Their encounter can augur a new era of peace and prosperity and a departure from anguish and conflict. The ongoing polarisation of the various Muslim groups, banking on the primacy of their religious identity over everything else, including national/ethnic/class identity, has been a painful experience. Yet, it is equally important to define modernity in its larger theoretical context before we may proceed to see the nature of the emerging Muslim discourse.

Modernity, modernisation, modernism, Westernisation, Westernism and now postmodernity, describe multiple processes beginning with the explorations, colonialism, industrialisation and capitalism first experienced in Western Europe before being transferred to the

Americas and subsequently to the colonies. The post-Renaissance forces of rationalism, nationalism, secularism, capitalism, socialism, urban professionalism, and more recently of gender equality and social mobility, are some of the powerful imprints of modernisation, which collectively underwrite modernity.<sup>11</sup> The transformation from *traditional* modes of collective socio-political and economic patterns and hierarchies to more professionalised, choice-based and interest-based structures largely accounts for modernisation. Modernity, inclusive of all socio-political and economic forces, has been redefining *traditional* societies in the wake of serious socio-moral dislocations. Not only are traditional social patterns of relationship, such as kinship, clan or extended family systems, giving way to larger ethnic or national communities; newer modes of production, complex management hierarchies and human vulnerabilities to trans-regional influences have also engendered serious uncertainties. Rooted in an unblemished idea of progress, this dominant Western construct received its sustenance from philosophers as diverse as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Charles Darwin and Max Weber. Both Marx and Durkheim believed that 'modernity' was an *essential* stage for any society in its course to development. Their universalisation of the Western model does not deprive it of its significance and relevance to all human societies, including Muslims. While health, education and means of communications have certainly improved in many developing regions, urbanisation, migrations, militarism and consumerism have unleashed several destabilising forces including ethnic, religious and sectarian volatility as well as serious issues of corruption and criminalisation. The ruling elites in the developing world, despite their nationalist pretensions, are mainly motivated by their class-specific interests, but have failed to ameliorate the pervasive anomalies, varying from disempowerment to economic inequity. On the contrary, by using the given state structures to suit their own whims and particular interests, and with the nodding assent of external powers, they have simply exacerbated social conflicts. Their continued dependence on multiple forms of Western largesse has vetoed indigenous regenerative efforts for self-reliance and dented the prevalence of the liberal and egalitarian ethos offered by the first generation of modernists and nationalists. This metamorphosis has not only weakened the morale of vast sections of the populace but has also further marginalised vulnerable groups such as minorities and women.<sup>12</sup>

## MODERNITY, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND RACISM

Although modernity has led to numerous positive changes, it has also engendered serious problems of inequity in the form of organised slavery, the persisting forces of racism and a strengthened tradition of warfare. Millions of Africans were shipped to the Western hemisphere in subhuman conditions to run the plantation economies for generations. The 'peculiar institution' uprooted millions of people from traditional societies to suffer from slavery and racism in the modern world. In the same way, the colonial enterprise not only caused the socio-psychological subjugation of vast regions, it equally spawned human, economic and ecological depredations. At another level, imperial warfare and interstate conflicts caused global wars, the Holocaust, ethnic cleansing and a whole range of forces rooted in institutionalised racism.<sup>13</sup> Each form of collective violence – slavery, colonialism, warfare and racism – requires volumes to encapsulate the empirical details, but it is the evolution of modern racism in its scientific form that here demands more serious attention. Not only does racism pose the greatest challenge to pluralism and human rights, it is also the greatest cause of alienation in the Afro-Asian world. While the Western democracies have made significant improvements in recent years, the institutional forms of racism and the indifferent, if not outright hostile, attitude towards the peoples of former colonies as hordes of spongers and barbarians still lurks behind the smokescreen. Of course, racism, in its newer and collective forms, is the most pernicious challenge to a global humanism.

Since the Second World War, many sociologists have been looking at racism both as an ideological construct and a scientific classification based on biological/genetic factors. But the fact remains that the hierarchical categorisation of global communities through such criteria lacks equity and codifies 'the way in which "white" Europeans have historically set out to dominate, exploit and kill "inferior" peoples'.<sup>14</sup> Traditionally, racism in the West has been projected through anti-black and anti-Semitic (that is, hostile to both Jews and Arabs) trajectories, but over the last half century it has become anti-immigrant, especially immigrants from the Afro-Asian world. The hegemonic nature of the Western relationship with the postcolonial world, as reflected in foreign policy, the erection of strict immigration regimes and, more recently, the profiling of several cultural groups, has, in some cases, further regimented this unevenness. Soci-

ologists and anthropologists differ on the historicity and definition of racism as such, which is also a barrier to the total eradication of racism. While racism displayed in pubs, football grounds, streets, factories and markets may appear crude and stereotypical, its subtle forms amongst the educated and well-placed elite are well-entrenched and proportionately more dangerous. That is why institutional racism, as borne out by reports such as *Islamophobia* (1997), or *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Macpherson Police Inquiry Report, 1999)*, remains defiant and difficult to document. In a powerful way, it is a top-down phenomenon in which the elite formulates and disseminates racism to the grassroots, where it becomes more explicit and violent. For example, the media and politicians throughout Europe and Australia gave out exaggerated accounts of asylum seekers during 2000–03, leading to the sought-after right-wing electoral victories and adding to further strict immigration policies. As reported in a nationwide survey (2000) in Britain, people were subtly led to believe that asylum seekers were a burden on society and the economy.<sup>15</sup> Time and again, ‘bogus’ asylum seekers were portrayed as the ‘new’ enemies from ‘within’.<sup>16</sup>

The origin of this recent racist legacy is contemporary with modernity, in that the European quest for identity, to a great extent, hinges on racial differentiation.<sup>17</sup> On the Iberian Peninsula, anti-Moorish and anti-Jewish sentiments were defined through a religious idiom that accompanied the Catholic Inquisition from the 1440s. But it was during the eighteenth century that several European scholars started to theorise on racism by developing pseudo-scientific explanations.<sup>18</sup> The enduring biblical attitudes towards Africa, blackness, Jews and Muslims were now combined with so-called scientific and anthropological interpretations. The Swedish scholar, Carolus Linnaeus, in his *Systema Naturae* (1735), divided humanity into four races on the basis of colour: white Europeans, dark Asians, black Africans and red Indians. A little later, Johann Frederich Blumenbach added another category of Caucasians but still subscribed to monogenesis – the theory that the origin of all is from the same human source. Despite this colour-based differentiation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution stipulated more tolerance. However, from the 1850s onwards, Comte Gobineau and Robert Knox proffered strict boundary-based differentials among the races. Within the context of *fin-de-siècle* Europe, Count Gobineau and other exponents of Eurocentricism reflected the anxieties and tensions of rapidly changing times. In *The Races of Men* (1850), in

which he established the modern science of race, Knox dismissed the possibility of any hybrid race. His views also reflected contemporary European fears of miscegenation. Knox seriously considered whites intellectually and physically superior to all other groups and thus departed from the idea of the universality of humankind. Knox also highlighted intra-European racial differences, between Saxon, Nordic, Celtic, Slovenian and Sarmatian groups. Gobineau's ideas of racial superiority of the Europeans – Aryans – achieved immense popularity in Germany, where amidst *Volksgeist* trends racism, combined with extreme nationalism and a growing desire for imperial possessions, assumed pivotal proportions. The myth of Aryan supremacy was strongly advocated in the newly unified Germany, where, earlier, influential Germans such as Richard Wagner had harboured racist sentiments. In France and Britain, influential writers like Ernest Renan and Thomas Carlyle supported theories of the racial superiority of whites over non-whites, and together with the Orientalist and imperialist discourses, the Victorian era was symbolised by the Kiplingesque concept of the 'white man's burden'.<sup>19</sup> From the 1870s, racism in Europe and the United States assumed more sinister forms due to the forces of the new imperialism, jingoistic nationalism, greater social mobility, the evolution of political parties seeking votes, and populist ideologies such as fascism. This phase of scientific racism hinged on biological and qualitative differences between the whites and non-whites. At another level, in addition to the white-black differential, new intra-white and intra-black hierarchies and categories were essentialised. For instance, Jews were defined as biologically different from Aryans and other dominant white groups. This form of reinvigorated anti-Semitism was pervasive in Europe. In the same manner, the new hierarchies proposed for non-whites emphasised the qualitative physical, cultural and intellectual differences between the Africans, Arabs, Indians and East Asians. The scramble for Africa, interstate conflicts in Europe and access to an overreaching media converted racism into a pervasive and institutionalised ideology.

The Ku Klux Klan, Nazis, apartheid, Oswald Mosley's Union Movement, Enoch Powell's tirades, neo-Nazis such as the British National Party, Le Pen's National Front, Austria's Freedom Party and sections within mainstream parties across the Atlantic have been the varying manifestations of similar legacies. However, post-1945 racism, sometimes also called neo-racism, is more complex and is largely directed against immigrants and their descendants, while

erstwhile anti-Irish and anti-Jewish sentiments have somewhat subsided. In Western Europe, many immigrant communities are from the former colonies and are predominantly not only non-white but also non-Christian. Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs and other religious identities have usually been viewed as *different* according to the touchstone of colour, culture and class. Despite the outlawing of racist policies and rhetoric through civil legislation, political correctness and legal injunctions, more subtle forms of racism persist.<sup>20</sup> The minorities are further disadvantaged because of their origins in developing, postcolonial regions which, for a long time, have been perceived as 'inferior', 'emotional', 'pre-modern' and 'backward', if not totally barbarian. The modern type of racism – neo-racism – is mostly overt, which, as seen during the Rushdie affair or following the bombing of the World Trade Center, can become covert through selective violence and harassment. Neo-racism is articulated through irresponsible media portrayals, hate-mongering by political parties and by straightforwardly racist groups, and is most dangerous in its institutionalised forms.

#### FROM REJECTION TO REASSERTION

The forces of political Islam or Hindutva, and projects like Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia and Pan-Slavism, are all societal throwbacks rejecting the erstwhile statist hierarchies, which are collectively perceived as bankrupt and outmoded. They are also the manifestations of modernity gone astray or responses to uneven reformism and Western hegemonism. By posing as ideal alternatives they are simply discretionary, and while using traditional symbols they equally rely on modern means and strategies. Disillusionment with independence, intermittent military takeovers and monopolist monarchies, and disenchantment with nominally democratic orders weak on delivery and strong on promises have also contributed to the wider malaise.<sup>21</sup> Like their opponent regimes, in their pursuit of conformity, these societal activists are equally oppressive, gender-specific and ethnically exclusionary, leaving very little space for moderate and mediatory forces. In most cases, these fundamentalists threaten their own beleaguered civil societies with complete extinction. Although in several instances such groups have declared war on the rulers, in some curious cases, notably in the former Yugoslavia, BJP-led India, Zia-controlled Pakistan and Taleban-led Afghanistan, they have tended to work in tandem with their national

authorities.<sup>22</sup> Though uneven and rather discretionary development has itself caused serious backlashes in the Muslim world, leading to desperate acts, again this should not be read as total rejection of modernisation as such. It is curious to note that in critiquing modernity the postmodernists in the West and the Islamicists share a unique convergence. Both are opposed to individualism and territorial nationalism for the perceived dehumanisation that they may entail.<sup>23</sup>

The divergence in handling Westernised modernity has created deep fissures between the traditionalists and modernising reformists in all Muslim societies, including Turkey. Traditionalists or revivalists like the Ikhwan in Egypt, the Deobandis and Brelvis in British India,<sup>24</sup> the Salafis in North Africa, the Wahabis on the Arabian Peninsula, the Mujtahids in Persia and various mystical *silsilahs* saw in Islamic revival a true, as well as the only, solution to the Muslim predicament. The reformists, on the contrary, saw no other way out than accepting the dictates of modern (Western) civilisation through its manifestations such as the English and French languages, adoption of Western education and a *national* redefinition of society as a territory-based, sovereign *political* community. In Muslim India the early modernising leader was Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98), who not only opened a major Western-style academic institution in Aligarh but also tried to reinterpret Quranic knowledge. The traditionalists were inherently Pan-Islamicists, though in several exceptional cases such as Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (1839–97) and his Egyptian student, Muhammad Abduh, or some Young Turks, they also included elements which, despite their rootedness in Islam, were willing to coopt some Western values without surrendering Islamic trans-territoriality – milletism. That is why, in British India, one finds a powerful trans-regionalism in the works of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1875–1938) and among the leaders of the Khilafat Movement (the movement in India for preservation of the caliphate), for whom Ottoman Turkey symbolised the last remnant of Islamic milletism. Iqbal, however, accepted the necessity of territory-based nationalism because of its liberationist premise. In his famous presidential address to the All-India Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad, he envisioned a separate statehood/nationhood for Indian Muslims. The traditionalist Muslims in South Asia were led by various parties and personalities including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad<sup>25</sup> and Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi.<sup>26</sup> These two scholar-politicians both started as journalists and became the leaders of two powerful religio-political

organisations. To Iqbal, the eventual Muslim fraternity could be achieved following complete independence of the entire colonised Muslim world through nationalist struggle. Thus, to him, nationalism had become a necessary evil – ‘one of many new gods’ – though its liberationist ideology was inherently ‘irreligious’ by virtue of idealising secular over sacred and mundane over moral.<sup>27</sup> To Iqbal, as he confided to Halide Edib Khanum, the Turkish republic did not pose any contradiction since Kemal Ataturk’s dynamism had saved the sinking boat; but to the traditionalist Maulana Azad, the Khilafat, even in its symbolic sense, was a necessity for the Muslim world. To the Indian Muslims, Turkey, with its sultanate and khilafat, symbolised the last Muslim sovereign entity resisting the Andalusia syndrome. They were initially confused when Kemal himself abolished these institutions but rejoiced with his establishment of a republic through a valiant anti-colonial campaign. It was his anti-Western campaign that brought Indian Muslims back to rally around him, though they were baffled by some of his most radical reforms.<sup>28</sup>

#### MUSLIM DISCOURSE: A HALF-WAY HOUSE

One may decry the orthodox and fundamentalist elements among Muslims for being overtly aggressive, anti-reformist and solidly intolerant, but looking at the post-independence histories of almost all Muslim countries, it becomes apparent that the monopolistic, arrogant, class-centred and supercilious policies of the ruling elites have not been fair either. Corruption, coercion, centralisation and opportunism have further disempowered vast echelons of society which, in several cases, are subscribing to political Islamism. In its current context, political Islam, sometimes called *Salafiyya* (a return to early Islam), remains undefined. It may vary from place to place but is a reality which Muslims have to deal with. Typical Western denunciation of political Islam as merely barbaric fundamentalism – with reference to the Taleban in Afghanistan, the GIA in Algeria and similar groups in other Muslim polities – adds to the pervasive clerical fury in the midst of which reformers and moderate forces alike lose out. Political Islam at one level is dehegemonising, at another it is utopian since it promises generalist and unresearched deliverance and prosperity. It acts like a soothsayer in the face of Western rejection of Islam and the surrogacy of Westernised elites in the Muslim world. In that sense it has a class dimension, even though it promises to be classless. Ironically, political Islam in its

extreme manifestations is becoming more and more introvert, violent and anti-women.<sup>29</sup> It is equally intolerant of pluralism – both ethnic and doctrinal – and thus is becoming a medium for coercive uniformity. Even if it triumphs, as it has in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iran, its own ambiguous joyriding with the state may preclude any possibility for a new, open, tolerant and forward-looking reformism.<sup>30</sup> Political Islam is modernising yet inherently anti-Western and is keen on obtaining political power to transform society from above. In most cases it is led by the disempowered, literate, intermediate class (*bazaari*) who are retaliating against the state-led forces of monopolisation and corruption. So far, the manifestation of political Islam at governmental level, unlike various intellectual reconstructions, presents half-baked and rather oppressive hierarchies and sadly feeds into the stereotypes of Islam as being authoritarian. On the other hand, the course of intellectual reconstruction of Islam according to the times and exigencies, as initiated by early reformists including al-Afghani, Syed Ahmed Khan, Abduh and Iqbal, has been further enriched by scholars like Shariati, Fazlur Rahman and Abdul Karim Surush. However, such a reformist or even revolutionary activism is still embryonic. These thinker-activists, in their different ways, have stressed the need for understanding Islam within a changing political and scientific context by urging for a reshaping of Islam from within and without. For instance, to them, the *ulama's* single-mindedness, their simplistic emphasis on dogmas, their somewhat strange disregard for human diversity, and their official appropriation of selective Islamic mores for political expediency are evidently hegemonic.<sup>31</sup>

#### THE DIASPORA: A NEW ANDALUSIA OR A FRESH START?

The projects of both Westernised modernity and political Islam, despite their recent and intertwined histories, are powerful traditions which share commonalities as well as jealousies. Both are transformative and promise better futures. Modernity may be less past-oriented, while political Islam largely receives inspiration from the past and wants to recreate it. Modernity is this-worldly whereas political Islam is largely other-worldly, although both concentrate on this world to achieve their separate goals. Modernity received its impetus from diverse forces such as sceptical reformers and conforming state hierarchies while Islamicists celebrate the primacy of belief and seek political power to impose uniformity. Both are

ambitious, energised and have led to further dislocations through violence. Both subscribe to the intricate processes of selection and rejection to suit their own trajectories. Both have mundane and spiritual solace to offer yet both lack holistic solutions. Westernised modernity has the institutional wherewithal, economic power and military clout of global outreach. The globalism promised by political Islam is utopian and encumbered by doctrinal, ethnic, national and class-based loyalties. While postmodernity – a counterweight to modernity – may seek to demolish many of the modern edifices without putting satisfactory substitutes in their place, political Islam banks more and more on fundamentalist backlash. Islamicists enjoy and appropriate modern symbols, means and strategies to gain their objectives, whereas modernists tend selectively to use religious tokenism wherever it may help them form national identities and cultural monoliths.

Political Islam and the West have, both in the past and in the present, continued to see each other merely as religious monoliths. Both exist in each other and are far from being monolithic. West-led globalism is as hegemonic as the concept of *ummah*, though the latter may promise to be non-racial, if still difficult to obtain. The establishment of the Muslim diaspora in recent decades offers a unique opportunity to travel through the labyrinths of past and present within this interesting bilateral encounter. Most of the scholarly works on Islam and the West end up essentialising the differences, or focus only on more recent phases. They also concentrate on one or two case studies and those, too, within the limiting context of immigration, census figures, tables of achievers and non-achievers; or they simply reiterate Eurocentric views. This volume goes beyond these well-worn parameters; it begins, in Chapters 2 and 3, with a reconstruction of Islamic culture in Spain, to establish the historicity and nativity of Islam within the West. It also seeks to trace the evolution of the earliest form of tolerant pluralism on the Continent. These chapters centre on history, arts and the reconstruction of Spanish identity, with reference to a permeating anti-Muslim attitude, as manifested all over the country in yearly festivals – *fiestas* – where the cross overpowers the crescent. Modern-day Spain, Portugal and Italy are more tolerant than they once were, but it may take many years of effort to rediscover their Muslim past and its civilisational heritage, so as to engender greater acceptance for the Muslim minorities who live in their midst today. The decimation of

Muslims and Jews in the once thriving Iberian Peninsula reverberates today as the 'Andalusia syndrome'. Some Muslims fear yet another such total extinction. During the Bosnian crisis, this term was frequently invoked.

Chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on the Islam–UK equation, in which history, literature, Orientalism, colonialism and the postcolonial diaspora offer strong mutualities as well as areas of ambiguity and tension. This portion of the book looks at variables within the Muslim diaspora and goes beyond simple census-centred statistical tables and familiar but societally detached paradigms. Chapter 5 is an overview of Muslims in France, Germany and other European Union (EU) countries. It does not pretend to be comprehensive but locates the evolution of a more comparative outlook in which all the EU countries are seen gradually moving towards similar policies. Of course, the composition of the Muslim diaspora in each European state is quite different, but the regionalisation of Europe may offer more mobility and opportunities to the more recent generations of Muslims in Europe. Apart from language and socioeconomic strictures, immigrants have suffered from lack of organisational and institutional support mechanisms, which demand more cultural activism and concerted institutionalisation away from the routine and restrictive use of mosques. France's secularism needs to be more accommodative to plural needs whereas Germany is gradually moving towards accepting immigrants as new Germans. Chapter 6 may offer a new perspective on the emerging relationship between Muslims and Ireland, which has not been studied before in a volume of this nature. The topic, interestingly, was first discussed by Muslims themselves, offering a unique and comparative outlook. Chapter 7 visits the United States and briefly investigates the evolution and composition of Muslim communities, from the African slaves to present-day professional immigrants. US foreign policy, for example in the Middle East or South Asia, like that of some EU members, still does not reflect Muslim aspirations because of the newness of their Muslim community compared to some well-established counterparts. The situation also displays internal divisions and the lack of those institutional frameworks that could mount sustained and cohesive lobbying for overdue policy alternatives.

The Muslim diaspora in the West is both old and new and, undoubtedly, at the forefront of pluralist debates. How far these Muslims, while benefiting from the democratic processes and holding

a position of advantage in the West, are able to construct a substitutive discourse on the larger human interests of Muslim communities elsewhere remains to be seen. How far Western Muslims and their counterparts can learn from one another and develop a better understanding – unlike the Andalusias, ethnic cleansing and militarism of the modern age – poses a great challenge to all.

# Index

- Abbadids in Seville, 39  
Abbasids caliphate, 29, 42  
Abdar Rahman, the Entrant, 29, 44  
Abdar Rahman II, 42–3  
Abdar Rahman III, 30  
Afghan massacres after 9/11, 99–100  
Afghanistan under Taleban, 11–12; invasion of, xi  
African Americans, 97  
African Moorish costumes, 168  
African slaves, 8  
Afro-Asian world, alienation of, 8  
Aga Khan, 155  
Ahmadis in Germany, 132–3; in Scandinavia, 135  
Ahmed, Akbar S., 115–16  
Akhtar, Shabbir, 45  
Al-Aqsa Mosque, 43, 68  
Al-Baicin in Granada, 49–50, 53  
Alfonso VI, King, 56  
Alfonso X, King, 39  
Algerian Islamists, 129–30  
Alhambra Palace, 26, 34, 38; Quranic inscriptions, 54  
Ali, Mir Aulad Ali, at Trinity College, Dublin, 151  
Ali, Muhammad (boxer), 169  
Ali, Noble Drew, 170  
Ali, Tariq, 94, 109, 113–14  
Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, 94, 109, 117, 182–3  
Al-Mass'ari, Muhammad, of Saudi Arabia, 65  
Al Mansur (Ibn-i-Aaamir) 32–3, 44–5, 59–60  
Al-Mohads, 41  
Al-Moravids, 33–4, 39  
Al-Muhajiroon, 109  
Al-Murabitun, 33  
Al-Mutadid of Seville, 41–2  
Al-Qaeda, 160; and US, 179  
American influence on Ireland, 154–5; in the Muslim world, 154–5; media, 166; writers on Muslim Diaspora, 175–6  
Andalusia, 38–9, 181, 184; Syndrome, 13–17, 18, 24, Anglicanism, 78  
Anglo-American campaign after 9/11, 99–100; invasion of Afghanistan, 4, 156–7; invasion of Iraq (2003), ix–xi, 100, 158, 182; relationship, 66,  
Anglo-Irish literature and writers, 137  
Anglo-Ottoman relations, 69  
Anglo-Scottish relationship, 138–9  
Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, 159  
Anti-Semitism and Racism, 8–10  
Arabic, 106  
Arabs in England, 98–9  
Arkoun, Muhammad, 120, 130  
Asians in Britain, 88–90  
Asturias, Kings of, 58–9  
*Atlantic Monthly*, 169  
Austin, Allan D., on Muslim slaves, 167–9  
Austria and Balkans, 131  
Austro-German alliance with the Ottomans, 131  
Averroes, 46  
Azad Hindustan in Kabul, 131  
Badawi, Zaki, 109, 117–18  
Baker, Godfrey, of British East India Company, 146–7  
Balkan Muslims in Italy, 136  
Bangladeshis in Britain, 88–90  
Baquaqua, Mohamah G., 168  
Battle of Poitiers, 120  
BBC and the Muslim world, 66  
Ben Said, Mohammed (Nicholas Said), 169

- Berber pirates, 69  
 Berlusconi, Silvio, on Islam, xi  
 Bhutto Z. A. & Bhutto, Benazir, 65, 113,  
 Bilali, Salih, 168  
 Bin Laden, Osama, and Al-Qaeda, 3;  
 and Muslims, 90–1; and  
 September attacks, 156–7, 176,  
 182–3; and terror, 99  
 Bin Sannan, Abdallah, Cordovan  
 architect, 40  
*Birth of a Nation, The* (1915), 164  
 Black Panthers and Black national-  
 ism in America, 170  
 Blair, Prime Minister Tony, x, 93,  
 156–7;  
 Blunkett, David, on English  
 language, 96  
 Boabdil, Abu Abdallah, 18, 20, 34,  
 51–2  
 Bollywood, 110–11  
 Bose, Subhas Chandra, in Germany,  
 132  
 Bosnian tragedy and ethnic  
 cleansing, 3, 5, 11, 18–19, 95  
 Brighton, first South Asian  
 restaurant, 147  
 Britain and Islam, 64–119; slave  
 trade, 77; institutional racism,  
 108; South Asian women, 127  
 British blasphemy laws, 106, 110  
 denominational schools,  
 104–5; East India Company,  
 83; history, 81–2; India, 175;  
 Islam, 94; media on Muslims,  
 103–5; Muslim writers and  
 artists, 94; Muslims, 86–7;  
 nationalism, 102; National  
 Party (BNP), 82, 90, 97–8; press  
 on pluralism, 89–90; writers on  
 Islam, 71–8; Sikhs, 96;  
 theology at Oxford and  
 Cambridge, 79; views of  
 Muslims (Berbers and Turks),  
 74–8  
 Bush, President George W., x; and  
 Blair on Iraq, 93; on Islam,  
 156–7, 182  
 British Muslim Association (BMA),  
 104  
 Byzantine rulers, 42  
 Calcutta, Fort William College and  
 William Jones, 144  
 Carter, Jimmy, xi  
 Catalanian identity and Barcelona,  
 62  
 Charles V, 38, 49; and Alhambra, 52  
 Chechnya, x; and Russian attacks,  
 95  
 Chirac, Jacques, 125–6  
 Christian conquerors (Isabella and  
 Ferdinand), 19–63  
 Civil Rights and anti-Vietnam  
 protests in America, 169  
 Cold War in 1989–90, 1  
 Columbus, 3, 51; and Native  
 Americans, 21–5  
 Commission for Racial Equality  
 (CRE), 103  
 Commonwealth Immigration Act of  
 1962, 87  
 Constantinople, conquest of, 23  
 Cordoba, Conquest of, 44–5;  
 Mosque, 29, 32, 38, 54  
 Cornwallis, Lord, in Dublin, 147–9  
 Crusades, 2, 56–8, 66, 67–9, 93,  
 102, 120–3, 181; and Richard  
 the Lionheart, 78; and Inquisi-  
 tion, 73  
 Danish elections (2001) and immi-  
 gration, 136  
 Din, Ayyub Khan, British Asian  
 writer, 94, 109, 114–15  
 Din Muhammad, Warith, American  
 Muslim leader, 170, 174  
 Douglass, Frederick, 162, 173  
 Dublin, Chester Beatty Collection,  
 152–3  
 Du Bois, W. E. B., 162, 169, 173  
 Durkheim, Emile, 7  
 East African Asians in Britain, 88  
 Eastern Question, the Balkan issue,  
 79  
 England, summer 2001 riots, 82

- Equiano, Oloudah, 142, 146  
 Europe, Minorities in, 97–8;  
 European colonialism, 70, 78–81,  
 131; converts to Islam, 65;  
 Union (EU), ix, xi; summit on  
 immigration (2002) in Seville,  
 158  
 Europeanisation of the world and  
 Natives, 161–2  
 Expulsion of Jews and Muslims,  
 51–2
- Fallaci, Oriana, xi  
 Farrakhan, Louis, 169; on racism,  
 174  
 Father Divine, 170–1  
 France and Algeria, 120–4; and  
 Maghreb, 122–4; and Muslims,  
 120–36; and secularism, 128–9;  
 and veil affair (1989), 129–30  
 Franco, General Francisco, 26  
 French colonial control of Muslim  
 regions, 122–5; colonialism  
 and Orientalism, 122; converts  
 to Islam, 126–7
- Galacia and Christian pilgrimage,  
 57–60  
 Garvey, Marcus, 169–71, 173  
 Gibran, Khalil, 175  
 Graham, Frank, xi  
 Granada, emirate of, 20–63; fall of,  
 48, 55–6, 161–2, 181; Nasirid  
 Kingdom of, 134–5  
 Great Famine in Ireland, 137  
 Guantanamo Bay internees, 3, 177  
*Guardian*, xi  
 Gujarat (massacres), x,
- Hamidullah, Dr. Muhammad, in  
 Paris, 120, 127  
 Harlem Renaissance, 162–3, 170  
 Hastings, Warren, governor-general  
 of British India, 143, 147  
 Hejazi, Nasim, Urdu novelist, 38  
 Honeyford affair, 95  
 Holocaust, 8  
 Huntington, Samuel, on clash of  
 civilisations, 95, 159
- Hyderabad, state of, 145  
 Husain, Mir Muhammad, Oudh's  
 intellectual, 144
- Iberian nations and slavery, 167  
 Ibn al-Arabi, Mohy ud Din, of  
 Murcia, 36, 61  
 Ibn Khaldun, 36  
 Ibn Rushd (Averroes), 35  
 Ibn Said, Umar, 168  
 Ibn Zamrak, 36, 50–1  
 India and Britain, 83–4; and Ultra  
 Right (BJP) 2, 11–12  
 Indian Muslim elite in the West,  
 144–8  
 Iqbal, Allama Muhammad, 12–13,  
 38; in Sicily, 120; on Cordova  
 Mosque, 46–7  
 Iran–US relations, 176  
 Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 (WMDs), xi; Iran war, 3  
 Ireland and British Empire, 139–41;  
 EU, 151; and Henry VIII, 138;  
 Islam, Muslims in Ireland,  
 137–55; and England, 137–51;  
 and India, 139–44; and  
 religion, 137–9  
 Irish and Indian nationalists,  
 140–4; elite and Muslims,  
 152–3; in America, 137; papers,  
 146; views of Islam, 142–4;  
 villagers as seen by Abu Talib  
 Khan, 150–1;  
 Irving, Washington, 26, 59  
 Islam and/in Britain, 64–119; Chris-  
 tianity and Judaism, 1;  
 democracy, 180; early history,  
 27–8; France, 120–36;  
 Germany, 130–4; US, xii; West,  
 ix, 6; medieval Europe, 68–9;  
 Scandinavia, 135–6; Spain and  
 Mediterranean region, 71  
 Islam, Yusaf, 86  
 Islamic culture in Spain, 15–16,  
 18–63; Renaissance in Britain,  
 92; Sharia, 108  
*Islamophobia*, 9, 94,  
 Israel, 94  
 Italy, Muslim immigration to, 136

- Itisam al-Din in the West, 144–5
- Jama'at-i-Islami, 118
- Japan, post-War, 155
- Jinnah, M. A., 115–16
- Johnson, Ben, on Muslims, 72–3
- Jospin, Lionel, 130
- Judaic-Christian communities in the Muslim world, 181
- Kashmir, x; 95, Indian campaign, 5
- Kemalism in Turkey, 81
- Khan, Abu Talib, 138, 143, 144, 147–50
- King Jr, Martin Luther, 163, 173
- Ku Klux Klan and racism, 162, 164
- Kabbani, Nisar, 38
- Kabbani, Rana, 94, 109; on Orientalists, 116–17
- Kohl, Chancellor Helmut, on neo-Nazis, 133
- Khomeini, Imam, *Fatwa*, 2; on Salman Rushdie, 111
- Kureishi, Hanif, 94, 109, 112–13
- Lewis, Bernard, x
- Lings, Martin, 86, 109, 117
- London, x
- Maan, Bashir, 182
- Ma'asir-I-Talibi*, 148–9
- Madinat al-Zahara, 41, 47
- Mahomed, Sake Dean, 138, 144, 145–6
- Maimonides, 35–6, 46
- Makkah, 163
- Malcolm X on Pilgrimage, 156, 163; and Nation of Islam, 169–74
- Mamout, Yarrow, 167–8
- Mandela, Nelson, xi
- Marlowe, Christopher, on Muslims, 71–4
- Martel, Charles, 122
- Marx, Karl, 7
- Massachusetts (55<sup>th</sup>) Regiment, 169
- Massignon, Louis, 120, 130
- Massinger, Philip, on Muslims, 74–5
- Mattar, Nabil, on UK–Muslim relations, 73–9
- Mirror*, xi
- Moorish art, 32–3
- Moriscos in France, 20–63, 123
- Mudejar architecture, 40–62
- Muhammad, Elijah, 162–3; Nation of Islam, 169–74
- Muhammad, Fard D., 171
- Musa bin Nusayr, 28
- Muslim Arabs, 90; anxieties after 9/11, 118–19; centres in Dublin, 152–3; Christian encounter, 67–71; conquest of Andalusia, 28–9, 39; conquest of Iberian Peninsula, 67; consciousness, x; converts in the West, 160–1; Diaspora, ix, 4, 63, 65; discourse on modernity, 23–4, 64–5; empires, 140; feminism, 107, 180; immigrants in France, 125–6; intellectuals, 30–2, 109, 180; marginalisation in the West, 157–8; mysticism, 175; political issues, 79; population groups in Britain, 85–8; press in Britain, 104; rule, 67; secularism, 6; views of the west, 103; Muslims in America, 156–80; in Belgium, 136; in Britain, 64–119; in Germany, 130–4; in Italy, 136; in Netherlands, 136; in Switzerland, 136
- Muslim architecture, 38; Muslim cities, 20–63
- Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), 104
- Muslim world (OIC) and Afghans, 99
- Naipaul, V. S., 110–11, 116–17
- Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, 81, 120, 123–4
- Narbonne, 122, 127
- Nasirid Kingdom of Granada, 50–4
- Nation of Islam, The (Malcolm X), 169–74
- National Front of Marie Le Pen, 126, 129–30

- Native Americans, 21–3; elimination, 119; in the 1960s, 169
- Nawab of Murshidabad, 146
- New Statesman* on war, xi
- New York, ix
- Nordic regions and Islam, 135
- North Africans in France, 122–7
- North–South relationship, 70
- Nursu Movement in Germany, 133
- Oklahoma bombing (1995), 103
- Omar, Mullah Muhammad, of Taleban, 4–5, 13–14
- Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), xi, 3
- Orientalism, 2; and Britain, 64
- Ottoman(s) and Britain, 74–7; conquest of Constantinople, 102; decline of, 25–6, 181; defeat at Vienna (1683), 79
- Pakistan, Islamisation under General Zia, 11
- Pakistanis in Britain, 87–9; in Norway, 135
- Palestine, x; Israeli attacks on, xi, 157–8; and Jewish state, 131–2; peace accords, 18
- Peace marches on 15 February 2003, x
- Pedro the Cruel at Al-Cazar in Seville, 4
- Pipes, Daniel, x
- Pococke, Edward, on Islam, 76–7
- Political Islam, 13–16, 81–2
- Portugal, Muslim conquest of, 23
- Powell, Enoch, and British nationalism, 87–9
- Prophet Muhammad, 110–11, 122, 142–3, 147; and Catholicism, 143
- Prophetic era, classical Islam, 181, 183
- Protestant Revolution, 70
- Punjabi peasants on the West Coast, 175
- Quakers and slavery, 165
- Queen Elizabeth I, 5, 71, 77; and Muslims, 69
- Queen Victoria and her Indian staff, 84–5
- Quillam, W. H., English Muslim, 83
- Quran, Islam and African slaves, 166
- Quranic calligraphy, Kufic style, 44–5
- Racism and its European proponents in Nineteenth century, 9–10; contemporary Euro-American parties, 10–11
- Reconquista* and fiestas in Spain, 60–2
- Reformation and Modernity, 5–6
- Renaissance and Modernity, 6–7, 40
- Renan, Ernest, on Muslims, 102
- Robertson, Pat, xi
- Robinson, Mary, in South Asia, 154
- Rodinson, Maxime, 120, 130
- Roy, Arundhati, xi
- Runnymede Trust, 81; Report (*Islamophobia*), 100–6
- Rushdie, Salman, 94–5, 106, 109–12; affair, x, 65, 130, 182; and *The Satanic Verses*, 2
- Russian attacks on Chechnya, 4
- Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, 3; and the war, 18
- Said, Edward, on Muslim marginalisation, 156; and Orientalism, 79–81, 141–5
- Saiyid, Bobby, 109
- Saladin and Crusades, 69
- Salamanca, Muslim city of, 56–7
- Sale, George, 79; Quranic translation, 75–6
- San Francisco, x;
- Sardar, Ziauddin, 94, 109, 115, 182
- Scotland and Empire, 137–47; and South Asians, 98–9
- Seljuk Turks in Anatolia, 67
- September 11 attacks, 156

- Seville, Christian Conquest of, 39–60; Giralda Tower of, 39–40; Jewish quarters in, 45
- Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor in Delhi, 144–5
- Shahjahan Mosque in Woking, 83–4
- Shakespeare, William, 78; on Muslims (Moors), 71–2
- Sharon, Ariel, and Palestinians, 154
- Shaw, Bernard, 137
- Shirley, Sir William, on Muslims, 73–4
- Slave trade in Europe, 69–70
- Slavery in Americas, 158–74; and racism, 80–1
- Soloman, Job Ben, 167
- South Asian Muslim intellectuals, 38; travellers to Britain, 82
- Spain and the European Union, 26; Judaic-Muslim communities, 19–63
- Spanish Arabic literature, 30–6; fiestas, 39, fiestas in Valencia, 60–1; Inquisition, 48, 55–6; Islam, xii, 22–63
- St James, shrine and rituals, 57–60
- Stephen Lawrence Murder (1993) case, 91
- Stuart dynasty and Ireland, 139
- Studies of Islam in the US, 159
- Suez Canal, 124
- Sufis in Europe, 135
- Sultan, Tipu, in Ireland, 143
- Taj Mahal and Muslim architecture, 47
- Taleban and Afghanistan, 3–4
- Tamerlaine of Central Asia, 71–2
- Tariq bin Ziyad, conqueror of Spain, 28
- Terrorist attacks on 11 September, ix–x,
- Toledo and Mozarebs, 56
- Turks and Balkan Muslims, 120–6; and Kurds in Germany, 132–3
- Ummah*, 93; in Georgia, USA, 168
- Ummayyid caliphs, 28–30
- UN Conference on Racism, Dublin, (2001), 168
- United Nations, sidelining of, xi
- United States (US), ix; abolitionism and racism, 164–5; and Africans, 160–9; and African Americans, 160–84; and Balkan Muslims, 176; and Guantanamo Bay internees, 177; and Islam, 156–80; and Middle East, 179; and Muslim Diaspora, 174–7; and Muslim issues, 176–7; and Muslim states, 158–9, 179; bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq, 4, 176–7; campaign in the Muslim world, 4, 26; Civil War, 162; Muslim organisations, 178; policy in the Muslim world, 16; policy towards Palestine, 176; September attacks, 3, 163; slavery, ix; terrorist attacks, 65–6
- Visigothic Spain, 19–20
- Wales and England, 140
- Washington, Booker T., 162
- Washington, D.C., ix, *Washington Post*, 174
- West in Islam, ix
- West and Islamicists, 12–13; Muslim modernists, 12–13
- Western attitudes to Islam, 82; control of the Muslim world, 66; evangelism, 66; hegemony, 184; Muslims, 13–14; studies of Islam, 147
- Westernised Muslim elite, 2
- Wilde, Oscar, 137
- Yugoslavia, fall of, 3